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TOTAL PATENT EXHAUSTION!
SAMUEL F. ERNST'
ABSTRACT
The exhaustion doctrine generally provides that
when a patent holdersells or authorizes anotherparty to sell
a patenteditem, the patent rights in that item are exhausted,
and the patent holder cannot pursue thatproduct down the
stream of commerce to demand royaltiesfrom each party
that subsequently acquires the item. Patent holders have
often sought to evade patent exhaustion by draftinglicensing
agreements attending or authorizing the sale of their
patentedproducts that place restrictions on the use of the
patenteditem or otherwiseprovide that no patent exhaustion
has occurred. In Impression Products v. Lexmark, the
Supreme Court held that such post-sale restrictions are
ineffective to prevent patent exhaustion.' This overruled
Federal Circuit precedent holding that contractual
restrictions to evade exhaustion were effective so long as
they did not run afoul of antitrust laws or constitute patent
misuse. This author has long argued that the Federal
Circuit's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent was
incorrect-that post-sale restrictions could not prevent
patent exhaustion, as setforth in cases datingfrom the 1917
case Motion PicturePatents v. UniversalFilm to the 2008
case Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics.3

1Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University.
Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1535
(2017).
2 Impression

See Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustionfor the Exhausted Defendant:
Should Partiesbe able to ContractAround Exhaustion in Settling Patent
Litigation?, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 445 (2014) [hereinafter Ernst,
ExhaustedDefendant]; Samuel F. Ernst, Why Patent ExhaustionShould
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A per se prohibition on contracting around
exhaustion is justified by multiple policy principles,
including (1) the policy against restraints on alienation of
personalproperty; (2) the policy against compensationfor
patent holders above what is necessary to promote invention
(commonly known as "double-recovery'); (3) the need to
protect the boundary between federal patent law and the
common law of contracts andproperty; and (4) all of these
policies in addition to judicial efficiency when parties
attempt to evade exhaustion in drafting a patent license
agreement to settle litigation.
Some scholars argue that contracting around
exhaustion allowsfor welfare gains such as increasedoutput
and vertical price discrimination. These scholars contend
that the policy against restraints on alienation is a
misunderstood and outdated relic of the common law; and
that the policy against double-recovery has no empirical
justification. To the contrary, total exhaustion protects
modern consumers by preserving the used resale market,
reducing the cost of goods, andprotecting consumers from
being locked intoparticularbrandsandsecondaryproducts.
Arguments against total exhaustionfor consumer goodsfail
to account for the inefficiencies of personal property
servitudes, such as the uncertainty and research costs
resulting from post-sale restrictions, hidden costs of
products through tied secondary products, notice costs for
licensed manufacturers, and the needfor costly litigation to
test the validity of contractual restrictions under rule of
reason economic analysis-litigationthat will rarely occur
because it is beyond the reach of the great majority of
consumers.
In short, the Supreme Court was correct as a matter
of its own precedent and of sound policy that contractual

LiberateProducts (AndNot Just People), 93 DENV. L. REv. 897 (2016).
[hereinafter Ernst, Liberate Products].
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post-sale restrictions are wholly ineffective to prevent
exhaustion, regardless of whether they run afoul of antitrust
law or constitute patent misuse. Patent law is not the poor
stepchild of antitrust law. It pursues separate policies.
Moreover, to the extent contracting around exhaustion is
economically desirablefor high-end, non-consumer goods,
the Court's opinion does not result in absolute exhaustion in
all circumstances. Pre-sale restrictions and leases may
remain viable options for patent holders to evade
exhaustion. For high-end, non-consumer products where
there are lower transactionand notice costs relative to the
price of the product, these avenues are practicable, and the
concerns with servitudes and double recovery adhering in
the consumer goods context are ameliorated.
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INTRODUCTION

The
doctrine is
product (or
the patent

classic articulation of the patent exhaustion
that when a patent holder sells its patented
licenses a manufacturer to do the same), all of
holder's patent rights in that product are
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exhausted.4 The patent holder may not thereafter use patent
law to chase the patented product down the stream of
commerce and sue subsequent purchasers for patent
infringement, place restrictions on how the article might be
used, place restrictions on which secondary products may be
used with the product, or place any other restrictions on the
use or disposal of the patented product: "[T]he right to vend
is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold
being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law
and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may
attempt to put upon it." 5

As so articulated, patent exhaustion serves as a
consumer protection doctrine. In the context of patented
consumer products, total patent exhaustion provides
multiple benefits to consumers. Patent exhaustion reduces
the cost of goods by preserving a used resale market; allows
for competition in the market for secondary goods to be used
with patented products; prevents consumer lock-in to
particular brands of products; prevents hidden costs to
consumers; and reduces costs associated with researching
4 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008)
("The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that
item."); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873) ("We have repeatedly
held that where a person had purchased a patented machine of the
patentee or his assignee, this purchase carried with it the right to the use
of that machine so long as it was capable of use, and that the expiration
and renewal of the patent, whether in favor of the original patentee or of
his assignee, did not affect this right."); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S.
539, 549 (1852) ("[W]hen the machine passes to the hands of the
purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes
outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of
Congress."); see also Timothy B. Dyk & Samuel F. Ernst, Patents, in
BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 98:58,
at 895-96 (Robert L. Haig, ed., West 4th ed. 2016) (explaining the
elements of patent exhaustion).
' Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,

517 (1917).
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the restrictions that would otherwise encumber patented
products.6
One need not reach far for examples of these
consumer benefits. A new automobile likely practices the
claims of hundreds or even thousands of patents.7 If those
patent rights were not exhausted on the first sale of the car,
the patent holders could use their patent rights to place
restrictions on the resale of the car, the type of parts used to
repair the car, or even the brand of gasoline to be used in the
car.8 Were it not for exhaustion, the John Deere Company,

6 Cf

Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, CopyrightExhaustion and the
Personal Use Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2067, 2116-20 (2012)
[hereinafter Perzanowski & Schultz, CopyrightExhaustion] (describing
how copyright exhaustion protects consumers' personal use of copies of
works they own); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 894-901 (2011) [hereinafter
Perzanowski & Schultz, Digital Exhaustion] (detailing consumer
protection benefits of copyright exhaustion); Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L. REV. 885, 932-950 (2008)
(describing the harms associated with servitudes running with personal
property). The reader should note that this article does not discuss the
welfare costs and benefits resulting from the Supreme Court's other
holding in Impression Products - that the authorized sale of a patented
product abroad triggers exhaustion of U.S. patent rights. See Impression
Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1535. For an excellent discussion of these
complicated issues see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of InternationalPatent Exhaustion, 116
COLUM L. REV. SIDEBAR 17, 20-31 (2016).
' See Ernst, LiberateProducts,supra note 3, at 901; Dan L. Burk & Mark

A. Lemley,

THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT

53-54 (2009) (discussing the fact that "new products are so complex that
they can incorporate hundreds and even thousands of different inventions
- inventions frequently patented by different companies.").
8 Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1532 ("Take a shop that restores
and sells used cars. The business works because the shop can rest assured
that, so long as those bringing in the cars own them, the shop is free to
repair and resell those vehicles. That smooth flow of commerce would
sputter if companies that make the thousands of parts that go into a
vehicle could keep their patent rights after the first sale. Those
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which is already attempting to use contract law to restrict
how tractor owners may repair their tractors, could use the
more powerful remedies of patent law to achieve such
purposes. 9 And as we saw in the recent Supreme Court case
of Impression Productsv. Lexmark, manufacturers of printer
cartridges would like to use patent law to shut down the used
resale market for toner cartridges, which would drive up the
price for those products.1 0 Lexmark can no longer do so,
because the Supreme Court held that "Lexmark exhausted
its patent rights in these cartridges the moment it sold
them."' 1
This overruled longstanding Federal Circuit
precedent holding that patent holders could freely contract
around exhaustion, so long as those contracts were not
otherwise illegal. In 1992, a panel of the Federal Circuit held
in Mallinckrodt v. Medipart that the manufacturer of
patented aerosol mist delivery systems avoided patent
exhaustion when selling their products to hospitals by
stamping them with the legend, "Single Use Only." 1 2 This
allowed the patent holder to sue Medipart for infringement
when it refurbished the spent devices and returned them to
hospitals for additional use, thereby shutting down the used
resale market. 1 3 The Federal Circuit distinguished Supreme
Court precedent finding such contractual devices ineffective
to evade exhaustion by cabining it to situations where the
contractual restrictions constituted patent misuse or per se

companies might, for instance, restrict resale rights and sue the shop
owner for patent infringement.").
9 See Kit Walsh, John Deere Really Doesn't Want You to Own That
Tractor, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Dec. 20, 2016),

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/12/john-deere-really-doesnt-wantyou-own-tractor.
10

Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1529-30.

11 Id. at 1531.
12

Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 976 F.2d 700, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

13

Id. at 703.
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antitrust violations.14 "Unless the [contractual restriction on
patent exhaustion] violates some other law or policy (in the
patent field, notably the misuse or antitrust law), private
parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions
of sale." 15
This holding was called into question in 2008 by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Quanta Computer v. LG
Electronics.16 In that case, the Court held that when LG
granted Intel the unconditional right to manufacture and sell
its patented microprocessors, LG's patent rights in the
microprocessors were exhausted. 17
Patent exhaustion
prevented LG from suing Intel's customer Quanta for patent
infringement when Quanta purchased the microprocessors
and resold them in its computer products.18 The Court held
that LG's rights were exhausted despite language in the
contracts between LG and Intel disclaiming a patent license
to third parties and requiring Intel to notify its customers that
they could not combine the chips with non-Intel parts. 19 The
Court held:
Nothing in the License Agreement restricts Intel's
right to sell its microprocessors and chip sets to
purchasers who intend to combine them with non-Intel
parts..... [T]he question whether third parties
received implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta
asserts its right to practice the patents based not on
implied license but on exhaustion. And exhaustion
turns only on Intel's own license to sell products
practicing LGE patents.2 0

Id. at 705.
" Id. at 708.
16 Quanta Comput., Inc., 553 U.S. at 638.
" Id. at 636-37.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 635-37.
20 Id. at 636-37.
14
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For years after, Quanta commentators and courts
debated the scope of its holding. Perhaps the holding was
very narrow, such that the particular contract language at
issue was insufficient to evade exhaustion, but if properly
drafted, a patent-holder could avoid patent exhaustion with
. .
a post-sale restriction. 21 Or perhaps the ruling was a broad
decree that post-sale restrictions are ineffective to prevent
patent exhaustion.2 2
This author has long argued that Quanta overruled
Mallinckrodt and that "[t]he Supreme Court's opinion in
Quanta likely abrogated the viability of post-sale restrictions
to avoid patent exhaustion." 2 3 In the Supreme Court's 2017
decision in Impression Products, this view of Quanta was
confirmed. The Court held that its precedent invalidating
post-sale restrictions was not limited to restrictions that
violated the antitrust laws. 2 4 In those cases "it was the sale
of the items, rather than the illegality of the restrictions, that
prevented the patentees from enforcing those resale price

See, e.g., Ann Layne-Farrar, An Economic Defense of Flexibility in
IPR Licensing: ContractingAround 'FirstSale'in MultilevelProduction
Settings, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2011) ("My decidedly
non-legal reading ofthe Supreme Court's decision in Quantaasserts that
the Court did not rule out such contractual flexibility for patents.");
William LaFuze et al., The ConditionalSale Doctrine in a Post-Quanta
World and its Implications on Modern Licensing Agreements, 11 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 295, 315-16 (2011) ("[T]he proper
interpretation is the one that leaves the scope of the conditional sale
doctrine intact . . . [C]onditional sales and restricted licenses were not
outlawed by Quanta. Both are still viable options . . . .").
22 See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 615
F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (deciding that "Quanta overruled
Mallinckrodt sub silentio. The Supreme Court's broad statement of the
law of patent exhaustion simply cannot be squared with the position that
the Quanta holding is limited to its specific facts.").
23 Ernst, Exhausted Defendant, supra note 3, at 455.
24 Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1533.
21
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agreements through patent infringement suits."

25

The Court

continued that "ifthere were any lingering doubt that patent
exhaustion applies even when a sale is subject to an express,
otherwise lawful restriction, our recent decision in Quanta[]
settled the matter." 26

And so now we have total patent exhaustion. If a
patent holder sells or authorizes another to sell its patented
product, all patent rights in that product are exhausted, and
the patent-holder cannot thereafter use patent law to restrict
the use or resale of that item. 2 7
This article argues that the Court's decision in
Impression Products was correct as a matter of precedent
and policy.
Part II argues that Supreme Court precedent as
properly interpreted established a total bar on contracting
around patent exhaustion in the sale of patented products
since at least 1917, when the Court decided Motion Picture
Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing
Company.2 8
Contractual post-sale restrictions are
ineffective to prevent patent exhaustion regardless of
whether they violate the antitrust laws or constitute patent
misuse.
Part III of this article argues that total patent
exhaustion attending the sale of consumer products is
grounded in sound policies. Patent exhaustion is necessary
to effectuate the policy against restraints on alienation of
personal property, as the Supreme Court observed in
Impression Products.2 9 Some scholars argue that this policy
Id (discussing Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone,
246 U.S. 8 (1918) and United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241
(1942)).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1538.
28 Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
25

29

Impression Prods, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1532.
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is a misunderstood and outdated notion of the common law
that has no true welfare benefits. 3 0 These arguments
disregard consumer welfare benefits of lower prices and
information costs associated with patent exhaustion.3 1
Scholars further argue that vertical price discrimination
provides welfare benefits and efficiencies that total patent
exhaustion prevents. 3 2
Part III contends that these
arguments ignore frictions in the context of consumer goods
that prevent these welfare gains and allow for harmful
double recovery in the absence of total exhaustion.
Many of these arguments apply specifically to patent
exhaustion for the sale of goods to consumers. Some argue
that the ability to contract around patent exhaustion provides
welfare benefits in the context of high-end products with
many intermediaries.3 3 Part IV argues that to the extent this
is true, even under a total ban on post-sale restrictions to
prevent patent exhaustion, there remain ways to contract
around exhaustion. Companies can still employ pre-sale
restrictions or lease agreements to evade patent exhaustion,
and these devices are practicable in the context of high-end
products, where there are less transaction and information
costs relative to the high price of the products.34
II.

PRECEDENT: POST-SALE RESTRICTIONS HAVE
BEEN INEFFECTIVE TO PREVENT EXHAUSTION
SINCE AT LEAST 1917

The Federal Circuit's treatment of Supreme Court
precedent in Mallinckrodt was less an inadvertent
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Reasonable Patent Exhaustion, 35 Yale J.
on Reg. 513 (2018).
" See infra Part III.
32 See Hovenkamp, supra note
30.
" Olena Ivus et al., An Economic Model ofPatentExhaustion(San Diego
Legal Studies Paper No. 17-265, CESifo Working Paper Series No.
6638, 2017).
34 See infra Part IV.
30

59 IDEA 41 (2018)

Total PatentExhaustion!

51

misreading than it was an intentional overruling. The panel
in that case held that merely by stamping the legend "single
use only" on its patented aerosol medical devices, the patent
holder evaded patent exhaustion in those devices.3 5 The
patent holder was thereby able to sue for patent infringement
when the defendant refilled and resold the spent devices.3 6
The Federal Circuit distinguished Supreme Court precedent
finding such post-sale restrictions ineffective to prevent
patent exhaustion on the basis that "[t]he restriction here at
issue does not per se violate the doctrine of patent misuse or
the antitrust law." 37 In particular, the panel mischaracterized
the Supreme Court's 1917 case Motion Picture Patents as
finding the contractual restriction at issue in that case
ineffective to prevent exhaustion because it violated antitrust
law:
In Motion Picture Patents a license notice was
attached to patented movie projectors, stating that the
purchaser had the right to use the machine only with
motion picture films that were leased from the
patentee. The defendant used a patented projector
with films leased from other sources. The Court
condemned the patentee's tie-in as illegal, since it
extended the 'scope of its monopoly' to materials
which were not part of the patented invention.' 8

The Federal Circuit thereby announced a new rule (to
be found nowhere in Motion PicturePatents) that post-sale
contractual limitations were effective to evade exhaustion so
long as they were not otherwise illegal under antitrust or
patent misuse doctrine. 3 9 The court cabined Supreme Court
" Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701.
6 id.
3 Id.
38 Id. at 704 (citing Motion PicturePatents Co., 243 U.S. at 516).
39 Id. at 701 ("Use in violation of a valid restriction may be remedied
under the patent law, provided that no other law prevents enforcement of
the patent.").
3
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cases with contrary holdings by stating that "[t]hese cases
established that price-fixing and tying restrictions
accompanying the sale of patented goods were per se illegal.
These cases did not hold, and it did not follow, that all
restrictions accompanying the sale of patented goods were
deemed illegal."40
This constituted a misreading of Motion Picture
Patents because in that case, the Supreme Court took great
pains to make clear that it was not making a holding that the
post-sale restriction at issue violated the antitrust laws. The
plaintiff in that case, Motion Picture Patents, held a patent
on methods of using film projectors and granted a license to
a third party authorizing the manufacture and sale of
projectors that practiced this method.4 1 Under facts nearly
identical to Mallinckrodt, the licensee was required to affix
a plate to the projectors it sold purporting to impose a postsale restriction on the use of the projectors that they be used
only with a particular type of film reel made by the patent
holder.4 2 Then the patent holder sued Universal Film
Manufacturing Company for patent infringement when that
company supplied unauthorized film reels to end users of the
projectors. 4 3
The Supreme Court held that the patent infringement
claims had to be dismissed, not because the post-sale
restriction violated the antitrust laws, but because the right
to exclude is "exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the
article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of
the patent law and rendered free of every restriction which
the vendor may attempt to put upon it." 44 The Court based

its ruling on "the plain meaning of the statute,"-the patent
statute-and observed that "[flor more than a century this
Id. at 704.
Motion PicturePatents Co., 243 U.S. at 506.
42 Id. at 506-07.
43 Id. at 508.
40
41

44

Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
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plain meaning of the statute was accepted as its technical
meaning, and that it afforded ample incentive to exertion by
inventive genius is proved by the fact that, under it, the
greatest inventions of our time, teeming with inventions,
were made." 45 The Court did state that it is "confirmed in
the conclusion which we are announcing" by the fact that
Congress "has enacted a law making it unlawful for any
person engaged in interstate commerce 'to lease or make a
sale or contract for sale of goods . . . on the condition,
agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use . . . the goods . . . of a competitor . .
But the Court explicitly states that "[o]ur conclusion
renders it unnecessary to make the applicationof this statute
to the case at bar."47 The Court found the post-sale
restriction ineffective to evade exhaustion as a matter of
patent law, not antitrust law, as it made clear again in
Impression Products, when it stated, "it was the sale of the
items, rather than the illegality of the restrictions, that
prevented the patentees from enforcing those resale price
agreements through patent infringement suits." 4 8
The
Federal Circuit's statements in Mallinckrodt that the
Supreme Court was applying antitrust law to invalidate postsale restrictions therefore constituted an almost willful
misreading of that precedent.
Any doubt that post-sale restrictions are ineffective
to evade patent exhaustion should have been finally put to
rest by the Supreme Court's 2008 opinion in Quanta. In that
case, LG authorized Intel to make and sell its patented
microprocessors. 4 9 The Supreme Court held that LG thereby
exhausted its patent rights in the microprocessors and could
243 U.S. at 513.
Id. at 517 (quoting Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012)) (ellipses added).
47 Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
45 Motion PicturePatents Co.,
46

48 Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1533.
49 Quanta Comput., Inc., 553 U.S. at 636.
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not sue Quanta for patent infringement when it purchased the
devices from Intel and resold them in Quanta computers.o
The Court held that LG's statement in its license with Intel
that it "disclaimed" any license to third party purchasers to
practice its patents was ineffective to evade patent
exhaustion.5 1 "[T]he question whether third parties received
implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta asserts its right
to practice the patents based not on implied license but on
exhaustion." 52 There was no argument in Quanta that the
post-sale restriction at issue in that case violated antitrust
policy or constituted patent misuse, and the Supreme Court
cites to no law other than the patent law in holding that the
post-sale restriction was ineffective to evade exhaustion.
Hence, the Mallinckrodt rule that post-sale restrictions are
effective so long as they are not otherwise illegal was plainly
abrogated by Quanta.
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit persisted in the
Lexmark v. Impression Products en banc opinion in holding
that post-sale restrictions are effective to evade patent
exhaustion so long as they are "otherwise lawful." 5 3 In
response, the Supreme Court made plain that this notion had
long been contrary to Supreme Court precedent: "This Court
accordingly has long held that, even when a patentee sells an
item under an express restriction, the patentee does not retain
patent rights in that product."54

Id. at 635-37.
Id. at 637.
52 Id.
' Lexmark Int'l v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 742 (Fed. Cir.
2016) rev'd en banc sub nom., Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523
(2017).
54
Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1532-33 (citing Quanta Comput.,
Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Boston
Store of Chicago, 246 U.S. 8 (1918)).
50
5
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POLICY IN FAVOR OF TOTAL PATENT
EXHAUSTION

If patent exhaustion is not the poor stepchild of
antitrust law, then what independent policies support the
doctrine? One principle justification against allowing patent
holders to contract around patent exhaustion is that it
safeguards the policy against servitudes running with
personal property. The Supreme Court has long relied on
this policy in crafting a strong exhaustion doctrine. In 1917,
in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Company, the Court
wrote:
Courts would be perversely blind if they failed to look
through such an attempt as this 'License Notice' thus
plainly is to sell property for a full price, and yet to
place restraints upon its further alienation, such as
have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke's day to
ours, because obnoxious to the public interest."

That same year in Motion Picture Patents, the Court
held that the patent holder could not contract around
exhaustion because "[t]he patent law furnishes no warrant
for such a practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and
annoyance to the public which the opposite conclusion
would occasion forbid it." 5 6 And one hundred years later, in
Impression Products, the Court wrote that "exhaustion has
'an impeccable historic pedigree,' tracing its lineage back to
the 'common law's refusal to permit restraints on the
alienation of chattels.'"5 7 The Court quoted Lord Coke's
seventeenth century treatise to explain that "if an owner
restricts the resale or use of an item after selling it, that
restriction 'is voide, because... it is against Trade and
" Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1917).
56 Motion PicturePatents Co., 243 U.S. at 516.

" Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1532 (quoting Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013)).
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Traffique, and bargaining and contracting betweene man and

man. '"58
Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's
understanding of the policy against servitudes is overly
simplistic. Herbert Hovenkamp writes that in Lord Coke's
time, "[i]n fact, there was no simple rule that all restraints on
alienation,
even
on
personal
property,
were
unenforceable." 5 9 Sean M. O'Connor agrees that "the Coke
quote itself may not support [the Court's] argument," and
further points out that in any event, the policy and the law
evolved in many different ways since 1628.60 Professor
O'Connor further argues that the policy against servitudes
was not the original justification for exhaustion in early
Supreme Court cases, even if it was cited by the Court in
defense of the doctrine in later cases.6 1
One can accept these corrections to the historical
record as entirely accurate and nonetheless conclude that a
policy against servitudes as the Supreme Court understands
it is a good idea. Preventing servitudes from attaching to
patented goods is good consumer protection policy in
today's economy regardless of whether we can properly call
that policy the policy against restraints on alienation of
chattels and trace it back to Lord Coke's seventeenth century
treatise.
Preventing patent holders from contracting around
exhaustion provides multiple benefits to consumers. First, it
preserves a used resale market and other secondary markets
for patented goods, which lowers prices.62
This was
" Id. (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360
(1628)).
59 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 26.
60 Sean M. O'Connor, Origins of Patent Exhaustion: Jacksonian
Politics, 'PatentFarming, 'and the Basis of the Bargain59 (U. of Wash.
Sch. of L. Res. Paper No. 2017-05, 2017).
61 Id.
62 See Perzanowski & Schultz, DigitalExhaustion, supra note 6, at 894.
But cf Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 25 (noting in the different

59 IDEA 41 (2018)

Total PatentExhaustion!

57

demonstrated in the Impression Products case itself, where
the ruling allowed Impression Products to continue
providing used printer cartridges at a lower price to
consumers.
Second, a total patent exhaustion regime
prevents patent holders from locking consumers into
particular brands of secondary products (for example printer
cartridges) that may be used with goods they own, which
allows for price competition for these products as well.
Third, servitudes on personal property impose notice and
information costs on consumers.63 Consumers must either
invest time into researching the restrictions on goods they
have purchased or, as is more likely with less expensive
goods, fail to discover the hidden costs in goods they
purchase. For example, a consumer may not discover at the
time of purchase that the low-cost printer he or she
purchased contains the hidden cost of a restriction that it be
used only with expensive, patented printer cartridges.
Fourth, personal property servitudes may result in "underuse
or inefficient use of resources subject to the restriction." 64
For example, many consumers will simply throw away a
spent printer cartridge if there is a restriction on refilling and
recycling it.
Some scholars argue that there are theoretical
welfare benefits to allowing patent holders to contract
around exhaustion. Ann Layne-Farrar argues that allowing
patent holders to charge licensing fees at multiple levels of
production allows for better monitoring of licensees and
"reduces licensees' incentives to underreport their relevant
context of mandatory international exhaustion, "[t]he fact that mandatory
exhaustion will benefit U.S. consumers does not mean that mandatory
exhaustion will increase U.S. citizens' welfare overall.... From a
perspective of pure national interest . . . the desirability of an exhaustion

regime depends on whether the gains to U.S. consumers outweigh the
losses to U.S. patent holders - an empirical question that no study has
successfully answered.").
63 Van Houweling, supra note 6, at 932-39.
64
Id. at 939.
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sales." 6 5 It is unclear that this underreporting of sales is a
pervasive problem, and to the extent it represents a social
welfare harm, it is unclear that it is a sufficiently critical
harm to compel eliminating a fundamental rule of our patent
system. Moreover, patent holders could take advantage of
multiple royalty charges to increase the total royalty charged
for the patent beyond what the market should bear.66 Market
frictions, such as the notice and information costs discussed
above could well prevent the free market from checking such
behavior.6 7
Another alleged benefit of allowing patent holders to
evade exhaustion is that it allows them to engage in useful
price discrimination. 6 8
In other words, by evading
exhaustion, patent holders can charge different prices for
goods and services depending on whether the patent rights
are exhausted, as Lexmark did with its printer cartridges.6 9
Those consumers who agree to use the product only once (or
with some other contractual restraints) get to pay less money
for the product.
Here again, however, notice and
information costs threaten to deceive the consumer into
paying more for the product than the ownership rights given
up would justify and allow the patent holder to hide these
costs. And whatever price savings the opt-out exhaustion
regime gives to consumers with one hand it takes away with
the other by eliminating the used resale market. Under a
total exhaustion regime, the patent holder can charge its full
patent monopoly price up front, but consumers are free to
reuse and recycle the products as they see fit, and those
consumers who wish to pay less can go to the used resale
market.

65 Layne-Farrar, supra note 21, at 1185.

Ernst, ExhaustedDefendant, supra note 3, at 466-67.
Id.
68 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 5; O'Connor, supra note 60, at 63.
69 Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1529-30.
66
67
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Professor
Hovenkamp
argues that evading
exhaustion allows for "variable proportion tying
arrangements." 7 0 This is a device whereby companies
charge less for a principle "tying" products (such as a
printer), so that they may charge more for the secondary
"tied" product (the cartridges), and thereby provide the
social welfare benefit of allowing customers who use less
ink to pay less money. But why do companies need to be
able to evade patent exhaustion to affect such a scheme? The
answer must be that otherwise the used resale market will
lower the price of the tied products. Hence, the argument
appears to be that patent holders must have a way to keep the
price of the tied products artificially high by evading patent
exhaustion in order to be able to sell the tying products at
such a low price. But these pricing arrangements are
apparently utilized and largely blessed by the antitrust
laws,7 1 and there is no evidence that the existence of used
resale markets makes them impracticable. Moreover, how
can we be certain that the sacrifice of a used resale market
and its certain benefit to consumers is justified by the alleged
benefits of a variable pricing scheme supported by
artificially high priced secondary products?
More broadly, to the extent these differential pricing
schemes provide economic benefits and have therefore been
blessed by antitrust law, then they may be enforced as
contracts, or, with respect to third parties, by resort to the tort
of tortious interference with contract (so long as they do not
run afoul
of common law defenses,
such as
unconscionability). If these contracts are otherwise legal,
why must they be enforced through patent infringement
suits?
Professor Hovenkamp argues that the Supreme
Court's rule that patent holders cannot contract around

70
71

Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 6.

Id,
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exhaustion is insufficiently nuanced because "[n]o further
inquiry is made into the patentee's market power,
anticompetitive effects, or other types of harms, whether
enforcement of the condition is socially costly or valuable,
or has positive or negative impact on innovation." 72 It is true
that total patent exhaustion is not required in every case to
prevent market harm; that is what antitrust law is for. But
harm to markets is not the only type of harm in this world
and rule of reason antitrust analysis is therefore not the only
method for determining harm. Patent law has a role to play
in protecting against harm to innovation and harm to
consumers; harm that might slip through the porous web of
rule of reason analysis. Accordingly, patent exhaustion
properly does not turn on such analysis; otherwise it would
be wholly duplicative of the antitrust laws and nugatory.
Patent exhaustion addresses other types of harm not
addressed by the antitrust laws.
Among the policies that patent law pursues beyond
antitrust policy is innovation policy. Patent law must strike
a delicate balance between encouraging invention by
granting an exclusive right that is inconsistent with our free
competition system and allowing for the flowering of
innovation free from such restraints. According, the patent
right must be carefully calibrated such that it grants no more
than is necessary to encourage innovation.
Patent
exhaustion has long been justified by the Supreme Court as
a necessary tool in this calibration by preventing patent
holders from achieving multiple recovery of the patent rent
at multiple stages of the distribution cycle. Without patent
exhaustion, patent holders could take advantage of
transaction frictions to obtain more profit than the market
would otherwise bear. In Motion PicturePatents the Court
wrote that "the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is
72 Id.

at 3.
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'to promote the progress of science and the useful arts."' 7 3
Accordingly, patent exhaustion ensures that the inventor
receives a royalty for his invention that is no more than what
is determined as the value of the invention on the free
market:
If his discovery is an important one, his reward under
such a construction of the law will be large, as
experience has abundantly proved; and if it be
unimportant, he should not be permitted by legal
devices to impose an unjust charge upon the public in
return for the use of it. 7 4

Scholars criticize this policy against double recovery
on the grounds that a single patent rent on the first sale might
not be sufficient to encourage invention. 5 According to this
argument, proponents of patent exhaustion must empirically
prove that one single payment is sufficient to encourage
invention, and have failed to do so. This puts the burden of
proof on the wrong side. We have had had substantial
innovation during the first period of total exhaustion from
1917 (when the Supreme Court issued Motion Picture
Patents) to 1992 (when the Federal Circuit issued
Mallinckrodt), a period that saw the development of
revolutionary

innovations,

from

the

airplane

to

the

Internet. 76 What evidence is there that the free market
determined value of an invention at first sale is insufficient
to induce the making of that invention? All of the evidence
7

Motion PicturePatents Co., 243 U.S. at 511 (quoting U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 8, cl. 8).
74

Id. at 513.
7 See, e.g., Ivus et al., supra note 33, at 4 ("[E]xactly how much surplus
is necessary to induce the optimal level of innovation is itself a hotly
contested matter, and there is no a priori reason to assume a single
license to an intermediate manufacturer, reseller, or purchaser is
sufficient to induce optimal investment.").
76 Samuel F. Ernst, The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine of

Equivalents, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 467, 496 (2016).
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rather points to the conclusion that a total exhaustion patent
regime does not discourage or encourage invention at all,
because the number of patent applications steadily rose
during the period of total patent exhaustion, during the
Mallinckrodt period, and up to the present time.
There is
no evidence of inventors out in the world who would like to
file for a patent, but decide it is not worth it because they
cannot split their royalty charges along multiple levels of
distribution.
IV.

REASSURANCE: THERE IS NO TOTAL PATENT
EXHAUSTION

Important new research by Olena Ivus, Edwin L.-C.
Lai, and Ted Sichelman provides the first "formal economic
model of domestic patent exhaustion that explicitly
incorporates transaction costs."7 8 The study concludes that
"absolute patent exhaustion may generate welfare gains
when transaction costs are high.
Conversely, when
transaction costs are low, presumptive exhaustion - which
allows for contractual opt-out - is most likely superior." 7 9
This suggests that for lower priced consumer goods, where
information costs are high and notice ineffective, "opt-out
exhaustion" does not generate the price discrimination
benefits proponents of such a regime postulate.8 0 But for

" See United States Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. PatentStatistics
Chart, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstat.htm.
" Ivus et al., supra note 33, at 5.
79 Id.

The authors of the study articulate this as a difference between
exhaustion in the copyright context and the patent context, but because
there are patented consumer goods as well as copyrighted consumer
goods, the relevant distinction would appear to be between low priced
consumer goods and high-end non-consumer goods. See id. at 5-6 ("In
the copyright industries, where there are few intermediaries, large
numbers of downstream customers, and low prices for each copyrighted
8
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high-end non-consumer products and services, contracting
around exhaustion may have welfare benefits."
If this be the case, then the Supreme Court's
Impression Products ruling is pitch perfect policy, because
there remain ways to contract around patent exhaustion that
are practicable only for expensive products and services. For
example, the Supreme Court made clear in dicta in
Impression Products that pre-sale restrictions on whom a
licensee may sell a product to remain effective to evade
exhaustion, because if the licensee sells outside of the
license, there is no authorized sale.8 2
Alternatively, a patent holder may decide to lease a
patented product, rather than sell it. Patent exhaustion is not
triggered by the lease of a product because the patent holder
retains title to the product and is free to dictate how it is
thereafter used or further distributed. 83 For high-end
products where there are less notice and transaction costs
relative to the price of a product, these avenues are
practicable, and the issue with hidden costs is ameliorated.
For example, if a consumer leases something as expensive
as an automobile, she is more likely to be on notice of
contractual restrictions in the lease such as mileage
limitations, and will not be deceived into overpaying for
such restrictions. On the other hand, if an inexpensive
product such as a printer cartridge is at issue, it will be
inefficient for the patent holder to structure the transaction
as a true lease, with title remaining with the patent holder
and the need for monitoring and enforcing return of the
work, one would expect high transaction cost inefficiencies which would
tend to dominate price discrimination benefits.").
81

Id. at 3.

82 Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1534-35. See
generally Ernst,

ExhaustedDefendant, supra note 3, at 460.
8 Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1529 ("When a patentee sells one

of its products, however, the patentee can no longer control that item
through the patent laws - its patent rights are said to 'exhaust."').
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product at the expiration of the lease. If the customer pays a
single, up-front price, retains permanent possession of the
product, and bears the cost of loss or destruction of the
product, the law should treat that as a sale even if the patent
holder attempts to name it a "lease" in order to evade patent
exhaustion. 8 4
Under such circumstances, under the
Impression Products rule, patent exhaustion will adhere and
the patent holder will not be able to use the patent law to
impose servitudes on the product to the annoyance and
inconvenience of the public.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's ruling in Impression Products
v. Lexmark, that patent holders may not use post-sale
contractual restrictions to evade patent exhaustion, is correct
as a matter of precedent and policy. The evasion of patent
exhaustion in consumer goods contracts would threaten the
used resale market, impose hidden costs on consumers, and
exact inefficient notice and information costs. For high-end
non-consumer products, patent holders can still avoid patent
exhaustion through a true lease of patented products, which
will allow for the welfare benefits of price discrimination
without imposing the costs on consumers that such schemes
impose for low-end consumer products.

84 See, e.g., Fisher Trucking, Inc. v. Fleet Lease, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 888,

889 (Ark. 1991) (applying an "economic realities" test to determine if a
particular transaction was a lease or a sale).

59 IDEA 41 (2018)

